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NOTE
PAVING THE WAY FOR MINDREADING: RE-INTERPRETING
“COERCION” IN ARTICLE 17 OF
THE THIRD GENEVA CONVENTION
JOHN ZARRILLI*

INTRODUCTION
Mind-reading is no longer a concept confined to the world of
science-fiction: “Brain reading technologies are rapidly being
developed in a number of neuroscience fields.”1 One obvious
application is to the field of criminal justice: Mind-reading technology
can potentially aid investigators in assessing critical legal questions
such as guilt, legal insanity, and the risk of recidivism.2 Two current
techniques have received the most scholarly attention for their
potential in aiding interrogators in determining guilt: brain-based lie
detection3 and brain-based memory detection.4
Neurologically inspired brain-based lie detection is akin to a
polygraph test, and primarily relies on functional magnetic resonance
imaging (“fMRI”) to detect deception. “The appeal of this brain-based
Copyright © 2022 John Zarrilli
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1. Stephen Rainey et al., Brain Recording, Mind-Reading, and Neurotechnology: Ethical
Issues from Consumer Devices to Brain-Based Speech Decoding, 26 SCI. & ENG’G. ETHICS 2295,
2295 (2020).
2. Sjors L.T.J. Ligthart, Coercive Neuroimaging, Criminal Law, and Privacy: A European
Perspective, 6 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 289, 291 (2019).
3. Martha J. Farah et al., Functional MRI-Based Lie Detection: Scientific and Societal
Challenges, 15 NATURE REVS. NEUROSCI. 123, 123 (2014).
4. Emily Murphy & Jesse Rissman, Brain-Based Memory Detection and the New Science
of Mind Reading, HANDBOOK HUM. MEMORY 1, 18 (Michael Kahana & Anthony Wagner eds.,
2020) (forthcoming 2021).
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lie detection approach is that, in contrast to most previous methods—
which detected the emotional arousal resulting from deception—it
measures physiological changes associated with cognitive processes
during deception and could therefore, in principle, be detecting the
process of deception itself.”5
In contrast, brain-based memory detection, or brain fingerprinting,
involves analyzing brain waves to determine whether “a given stimulus
is something that [the subjects] have encountered in their past, or
whether [the stimulus] is being encountered for the first time.”6 The
idea underlying this method is that our subconscious brains possess an
uncontrollable and perceptible response to familiar stimuli that an
electroencephalography (“EEG”) machine can register.7
This growing ability to peer inside someone’s mind raises
significant legal issues. A number of American scholars, especially in
the past fifteen years, have debated the constitutionality of forensically
employing mind-reading technologies on United States citizens.8
Almost no scholarly attention, however, has focused on the legality of
mind-reading technologies under international humanitarian law.9 This
Note seeks to fill this gap in the literature and explores whether the
administration of mind-reading technologies on a prisoner of war
(“POW”) in an armed conflict violates international humanitarian

5. Farah et al., supra note 3, at 123.
6. Murphy & Rissman, supra note 4, at 4.
7. Id. at 4–5.
8. Some scholars have argued that mind-reading technologies may unconstitutionally
infringe an individual’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. See, e.g., Sarah E.
Stoller & Paul Root Wolpe, Emerging Neurotechnologies for Lie Detection and the Fifth
Amendment, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 359, 374 (2007) (“If, however, [the courts] focus on the
communicative product and the violative nature of entering the suspect’s mind, they would likely
find [neurotechnologies for lie detection] to fall within the Amendment’s bounds.”); Ronald J.
Allen & Kristen Mace, The Self-Incrimination Clause Explained and its Future Predicted, 94 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 243, 248–50 (2004) (linking the connection between polygraph tests
and Fifth Amendment violations to mind-reading technology). Others have argued that mindreading technologies do not violate the Fifth Amendment’s absolute prohibition against
involuntary incrimination, but instead implicate the Fourth Amendment, which prohibits
searches and seizures without probable cause. See Kiel Brennan-Marquez, A Modest Defense of
Mind Reading, 15 YALE J.L. & TECH. 214, 258–60 (2012) (“The identification of private or sacred
space, in other words, goes to the Fourth Amendment, not the Fifth . . . [t]he mind, like the home,
is a place where seizures occur.”).
9. Only one scholarly publication has analyzed the legality of the use of mind-reading
technologies during the interrogation of foreign detainees. See Sean Kevin Thompson, Note, The
Legality of the Use of Psychiatric Neuroimaging in Intelligence Interrogation, 90 CORNELL L. REV.
1601 (2005) (arguing that the application of mind-reading technology on detainees violates the
Geneva Conventions).
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law.10
The legality of using mind-reading technologies against an
unwilling prisoner of war largely turns on the meaning of “coercion.”
POWs are entitled to a myriad of protections under the Third Geneva
Convention (“Geneva III”).11 One such protection is found in Article
17, which specifically regulates the general interrogation of prisoners.12
It provides that “[n]o physical or mental torture, nor any other form of
coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them
information of any kind whatever.”13 Moreover, uncooperative POWs
who refuse to answer questions “may not be threatened, insulted, or
exposed to any unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any

10. While other provisions in international human rights law (hereinafter HRL) similarly
limit interrogation methods, these provisions are inapplicable during international armed conflict
and therefore do not warrant further discussion. See id. at 1618 (noting that international
humanitarian law applies to detainees of the War on Terror who did not qualify for protection
under the Geneva Conventions). The main reason that HRL does not apply is because the United
States, as well as Israel, does not believe that HRL applies during international armed conflict,
especially when an international humanitarian law provision already applies to the situation
under consideration. GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 26 (2d ed. 2016).
Moreover, even if HRL did apply, it is doubtful that employing mind-reading technology would
violate any HRL prohibition. See Thompson, supra note 9, at 1626 (arguing that reading a
detainee’s mind does not violate the prohibition against cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment).
11. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva III]. Other provisions in Geneva III may also
circumscribe the use of certain interrogation methods, but are not applicable to mind-reading
technology and therefore will not be discussed any further. Article 13 of Geneva III, for example,
states that all POWs must be “humanely treated.” Id. art. 13. Additionally, the detaining power
has an obligation to protect all POWs, especially against “acts of violence or intimidation and
against insults and public curiosity.” Id. Here, the use of mind-reading technology on POWs does
not prima facie constitute inhumane treatment: fMRI, EEG, and other medical imaging
technologies are routinely used on civilians for medical purposes and pose no health risks. See
MEDICINE,
Functional
MRI
of
the
Brain,
YALE
https://www.yalemedicine.org/conditions/functional-mri-imaging-the-brain (noting that “an
fMRI is safe, painless, and noninvasive” and “there are no known health risks of the procedure.”);
HEALTH
SERVICES,
Electroencephalogram
(EEG),
NATIONAL
https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/electroencephalogram/ (noting that an EEG “is painless,
comfortable and generally very safe. No electricity is put into your body while it’s carried out.
Apart from having messy hair and possibly feeling a bit tired, you normally will not experience
any side effects.”). Furthermore, the blanket ban on medical experiments only prohibits
subjecting POWs to injurious treatment in the pursuit of scientific knowledge, but does not
otherwise prohibit using medical equipment for non-experimental purposes, such as
interrogation. See INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY OF 2020
Art. 13 (2020), https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/full/GCIII-commentary [hereinafter 2020 ICRC
Commentary] (noting that Geneva III sought to prohibit medical experiments “with a view to
preventing a recurrence of the cruel experiments which had been made in concentration camps
during the last war.”).
12. Geneva III, supra note 11, art. 17.
13. Id. para. 4 (emphasis added).
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kind.”14 Notably, Article 17 does not prohibit interrogation, but merely
limits the tactics available to elicit information.15
Based upon current, prevailing interpretations of “coercion” in
Article 17, mind-reading technology likely violates Geneva III. This
Note, however, argues that an interpretation of coercion more faithful
to the text and purpose of Article III would likely permit the
application of mind-reading technology during interrogations. This
Note will proceed in four parts. Part I briefly lays out the two prevailing
interpretations of coercion, noting their implications for the legality of
mind-reading technologies, and this Note’s interpretation of coercion,
which markedly differs from the prevailing interpretations. Part II
briefly expands upon the technology discussed in Part I—noting the
potential for more accurate mind-reading technology in the future and
the applicability of this technology to interrogations. Part III examines
current interpretations of the term coercion, formulates a new
definition by looking at the text and drafting history of Article 17, and
contends that the coercion ban is meant to protect POWs from physical
and mental suffering. Part IV then applies this new definition of
coercion to various mind-reading technologies, concluding that the
painless use of mind-reading technology does not violate Article 17 of
Geneva III.
I. INTERPRETATIONS OF COERCION
This section will proceed by first briefly summarizing the prevailing
interpretations of coercion. Subsection B then summarizes this Note’s
interpretation of coercion, noting its implications for the legality of
mind-reading.
A. Current Interpretations of Coercion and Their Implications for the
Legality of Mind-Reading Technologies
Article 17 does not define the term coercion. Scholars have
acknowledged that the lack of a clear definition of coercion makes it
difficult to determine if any kind of physical discomfort or scientific
method can be used during interrogation without the commission of an
illegal act.16 Two approaches to defining coercion, however, are
14. Id.
15. Thompson, supra note 9, at 1613.
16. See Stanley J. Glod & Lawrence J. Smith, Comments, Interrogation Under the 1949
Prisoners of War Convention, 21 MIL. L. Rᴇᴠ. 145, 153–54 (1963) (“The problem is at what point
physical discomforts cease to be minor and become illegal coercion. This presents a question of
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discernible in the Article 17 literature.
One approach, which can be called the ‘Free Will Approach,’17
defines coercion as any situation in which information is secured
against a detainee’s free will.18 Under this approach, brain-based lie
detection is arguably not coercive, since the POW must voluntarily
answer questions for the fMRI to detect deception.19 On the other
hand, brain-based memory detection is coercive, since the machine
extracts cognitive information even when the POW is not answering.20
The second approach, which can be called the ‘Duty Approach,’21
regards as coercion all harsh or intrusive methods designed to elicit any
information whatsoever.22 According to this approach, the purpose
behind the coercion ban is to uphold the POW’s “duty to refrain from
giving military information to his captors.”23 Thus, under this Duty
Approach, mind-reading technology is likely illegal as per Article 17.

fact which must be determined separately in each case . . . . some minor physical discomforts . . .
will not necessarily violate Article 17.”); William Ranney Levi, Note, Interrogation’s Law, 118
YALE L.J. 1434, 1463 (2009) (noting that while the Geneva Conventions “provide boundaries for
what might be considered permissible conduct in the interrogation of prisoners, definitional
uncertainty remains with respect to central interrogation-relevant terms . . . the Conventions do
not define coercion; they provide no articulable basis upon which to distinguish between lawful
physical discomforts and illegal coercion.”). On a more general note, one scholar who has
examined the general historical uses of the term coercion found that coercion has been used
synonymously with several terms, such as “violence,” “compulsion,” “punishment,” “force,”
“interference,” and the imposition of “one’s will on the will [of others].” Scott Anderson,
ENCYC.
PHILOSOPHY,
(Oct.
27,
2011),
Coercion,
STAN.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/coercion/.
17. This term is self-coined. No proponents of the ‘Free Will Approach’ and no
commentaries on the meaning of the term coercion, of which there are few, use this identifying
label.
18. Thompson, supra note 9, at 1618. See Dep’t of the Army, FM 2-22.3 (FM 34-52), Human
Intelligence Collector Operations ¶ 5-26 (2006) [hereinafter FM 2-22.3] (stating that “[p]hysical
or mental torture and coercion revolve around eliminating the source’s free will” and is “expressly
prohibited by” Article 17).
19. Thompson, supra note 9, at 1613.
20. Id. at 1617–18.
21. Similar to the ‘Free Will Approach,’ the ‘Duty Approach’ is self-coined.
22. See, e.g., The Judge Advoc. Gen. of the U.S. Army, Use of “Truth Serum” in
Questioning Prisoners of War, JAGW 1161/1157 (June 21, 1961), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL
Lᴀᴡ STUDIES: DOCUMENTS ᴏɴ PRISONERS ᴏғ WAR 708–09 (Howard S. Levie ed., 1979)
[hereinafter Use of “Truth Serum”]. Here, the Judge Advocate General of the Army stated that
POWs must be protected against “inquisitorial” methods of interrogation, which presumably
include harsh and intrusive questioning. Id. Though protection from “inquisitorial practices”
could mean protection from even basic inquisitive questioning, Article 17 does not prohibit
questioning but merely regulates the method of interrogation. Id.
23. Id.
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B. The Proper Interpretation of Coercion and Its Implication for the
Legality of Mind-Reading Technologies
This Note advocates for a different interpretation of ‘coercion,’ one
that is consistent with the plain meaning of the word, the surrounding
Article 17 statutory text, and the purpose behind Article 17’s inclusion
in Geneva III.24 Coercion, plainly, denotes “the use of physical or moral
force to compel to act or assent.”25 Common synonyms of coercion
include “compulsion,” “force,” and “violence.”26 Thus, the purpose
behind banning coercion was not to guard against some abstract loss of
free will or to protect the POW’s duty to refrain from giving military
information to the enemy. Rather, the purpose of Geneva III was to
protect POWs from the physical pain and mental suffering that
accompanies the use of force or threats, or, as one commentator noted,
to “prevent [prisoners of war from] being brought down to the level of
animals.”27 Since coercion as used in Article 17 permits interrogation
techniques that do not cause physical pain or mental suffering, the use
of painless mind-reading technology would probably not be considered
coercion.28
Anticipated scientific developments make the topic of mindreading both relevant and urgent. The meaning of the term ‘coercion,’
however, will have implications that reach beyond the successful
development of mind-reading technology. This Note’s argument that
“harm” is a component of coercion requires the international
community to agree on a threshold of harm (a topic beyond the scope

24. See discussion infra Part III.
25. Coercion, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (1961).
26. Coercion, WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY OF SYNONYMS (1st ed. 1942).
27. JEAN DE PREUX, COMMENTARY ON III GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE
TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 627 (Jean S. Pictet ed., A.P. de Henry trans., Int’l Comm.
of the Red Cross 1960) [hereinafter 1960 Commentary].
28. See infra Part II. While the actual act of mind-reading does not cause physical pain per
se, it could be argued that invading the mental privacy of an unwilling detainee causes mental
suffering and therefore violates this Note’s definition of coercion. The author of this Note finds
this argument unpersuasive. As used in Article 17, the ban on coercion prevents a capturing party
from acquiring information by use of threats of physical violence or other harmful psychological
techniques that produce mental suffering, such as forced nudity, sleep deprivation, hooding,
sensory deprivation, and mock executions. Moreover, the invasiveness of mind-reading is
essentially indistinguishable from the invasiveness of current methods of interrogation, which are
not considered to produce mental harm. For example, the data yielded by neuroimaging
applications is no more sensitive than data acquired through current methods of criminal
interrogation, such as DNA testing and polygraph examinations. It is doubtful that reading
someone’s mind constitutes mental coercion under Article 17, so this Note assumes that reading
someone’s mind does not constitute mental coercion.
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of this analysis). Moreover, an elemental formulation of coercion will
reduce uncertainty surrounding permissible interrogation practices and
provide a more concrete framework for countries to rely on when
constructing interrogation policies.
II. MIND-READING TECHNOLOGY: AN OVERVIEW
Deception is a major component of human behavior.29 In the law
enforcement context, deception frustrates the truth-finding process and
slows down the administration of justice. The challenge deception
imposes on the truth-finding process is why humans have always
“wanted to peer inside each other’s minds.”30 Early efforts at mindreading linked lying to certain facial expressions.31 Humans, however,
are rather poor at detecting deception when relying on their own senses
and intuitions, which has led to relatively recent attempts to rely instead
on technological instruments to detect deception.32 One prominent
example is the polygraph, which associates physiological changes—
such as changes to heart rate, electrical skin conductance, and blood
pressure—with deception.33 Despite inconsistent and lackluster results,
the polygraph is still widely used by law enforcement and government
agencies,34 a testament to the persisting human desire for lie detection.
The search for a more reliable method of lie detection has recently
focused on measures of the brain. Whether these neuro-based liedetectors are merely a product of wishful thinking or the first step in a
technological breakthrough is the primary question Part II seeks to
answer. The general takeaway is that while brain-based mind-reading
technology is still too rudimentary for forensic use, it has serious
potential to aid interrogators in differentiating lies from truth.
Subsection A discusses one neuro-based method, fMRI-based lie
detection. Subsection B focuses on another method, EEG-based
29. Theodor Schaarschmidt, The Art of Lying, SCI. AM. (July 11, 2018),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-art-of-lying/.
30. Eli Wolfe, Catching the Brain in a Lie: Is “Mind Reading” Deception Detection Sci-Fi—
or Science?, CAL. MAG. (July 22, 2015, 11:19 AM), https://alumni.berkeley.edu/californiamagazine/just-in/2016-02-18/catching-brain-lie-mind-reading-deception-detection-sci-fior#:~:text=%E2%80%9CNovel%20neuroscience%20techniques%20might%20soon,of%20the
%20crime%2C%E2%80%9D%20the%20Presidential.
31. Farah et al., supra note 3, at 123.
32. Gershon Ben-Shakar & Eitan Elaad, The Validity of Psychophysiological Detection of
Information with the Guilty Knowledge Test: A Meta-Analytic Review, 88 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 131,
131 (2003).
33. Id. at 131–32.
34. Daniel D. Langleben & Jane Campbell Moriarty, Using Brain Imaging for Lie Detection:
Where Science, Law and Research Policy Collide, 19 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & L. 222, 223 (2013).
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memory detection. Subsection C discusses a new neuro-based method
quite unlike the other two: real time extraction of current thoughts.
A. fMRI-based Lie Detection
The fMRI-based lie detection method allows for analysis of blood
oxygen-level dependent (“BOLD”) activity, which would permit
interrogators to differentiate lying from truth-telling.35 An fMRI is a
medical imaging technology that makes use of strong magnetic fields
to produce high-resolution, three-dimensional images of the body.36
Every few seconds, the fMRI takes a snapshot of the current blood
oxygenation levels in the brain.37 The use of fMRI as an interrogation
device to detect deception is premised on two assumptions: 1) brain
activity requires blood flow;38 and 2) several distinct areas of the brain
are associated with lying.39 Brain activity requires oxygen, which is
supplied by oxygenated hemoglobin in the blood.40 When a region of
the brain increases its activity, blood flows to the region to satisfy the
oxygen needs associated with the activity.41 Thus, oxygenated blood
flows to certain parts of the brain when a subject is lying, which can be
contrasted against the scan of a subject’s brain when said subject is at
rest or telling the truth.42
Two features of fMRI neuroimaging are relevant to Article 17
analysis. First, the imaging is neither physically invasive nor painful. The
subject of the scan simply lays down flat on a table that slides into a
donut-shaped circular casing.43 Second, the device requires
cooperation, as even a small “head movement could compromise the
quality of the scan.”44 For this reason, restraints, such as foam pillows,
are typically used to immobilize the subject.45

35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Farhan Hyder Sahito, Interrogational Neuroimaging: The Missing Element in CounterTerrorism, 3 INT’L J. INNOVATION & APPLIED STUD. 592, 595 (2013).
39. Langleben & Moriarty, supra note 34, at 223. A meta-analysis of the existing fMRIbased lie detection literature found that the regions that consistently showed deception-related
activity were the “bilateral dorsolateral and ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, inferior parietal
lobule, anterior insula and medial superior frontal cortex.” Farah et al., supra note 3, at 124.
40. Wagner et al., fMRI and Lie Detection, MACARTHUR FOUND. RSCH. NETWORK ON L.
& NEUROSCI. at 1 (Feb. 2016).
41. See id. (explaining how neural activity is associated with oxygenated blood in the brain).
42. Id.
43. Thompson, supra note 9, at 1607.
44. Id. at 1625.
45. Id.
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While fMRI-based lie detection was one of the first “mind-reading”
technologies in the 21st century to gain significant attention from the
scientific community, the technology has not developed into a viable lie
detecting device. Studies have shown that fMRI-based lie detection is
certainly better than chance at detecting deception, but not sufficiently
accurate for admittance into a court setting.46 Beyond accuracy
concerns, other scholars have shown that previous fMRI-based lie
detection studies cannot be certain that the neural activity measured
was associated with lying or memory recall.47 For example, subjects in
three lab studies were tasked with “stealing” one of two potential
objects and then asked to deny stealing both objects.48 The fMRI-based
lie detection method accurately matched between 71 percent and 90
percent of the subjects with the item they stole. A follow-up study,
however, persuasively pointed out that subjects had a richer memory
for the object they stole than the object they did not steal, and therefore
the fMRI scan did not detect deception, but rather detected the
subject’s familiarity with the stolen object.49
Two technological advancements, however, have increased the
validity of fMRI-based lie detection and also of fMRI-based memory
detection. First, scientists have developed a new approach made
possible by machine learning to analyze fMRI results: multi-voxel
pattern analysis (“MVPA”).50 Classic fMRI-based lie detection
associates certain regions of the brain (“voxels”) with lying.51 This
approach, nevertheless, ignores the fact that neural activity is typically
distributed throughout the brain.52 Rather than analyzing differences
between brain regions, MVPA attempts to differentiate activities based
on their unique distribution patterns throughout the brain.53 This novel
approach has already “enabled significant advances in memory
detection research.”54 Second, new neuroimaging technology, such as
46. Andrew F. Kozel et al., Functional MRI Detection of Deception After Committing a
Mock Sabotage Crime, 54 J. FORENSIC SCI. 220, 228 (2009).
47. Wagner et al., supra note 40, at 2.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Murphy & Rissman, supra note 4, at 21.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See id. (“For example, there is not any one location of the brain that shows significantly
greater activity when a subject perceives the letter X versus the letter O, and yet distributed fMRI
activity patterns within visual brain areas are capable of not only being used to decode which
letter a participant is perceiving on a given trial, but also which of the two letters a participant is
imagining.”).
54. Id.
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Magnetic Particle Imaging (“MPI”), produces a brain scan that is one
hundred times more sensitive than an fMRI and can capture very
detailed information, whereas classic fMRI only offers a generalized
snapshot.55 Feeding more granular information obtained from an MPI
into a machine learning algorithm will significantly increase the
likelihood of discovering patterns associated with lying and memory
detection.56
B. EEG Technology: Detecting Concealed Information
Another brain-based approach that can be used to assess guilt or
innocence is to determine familiarity with a distinct aspect of a crime.
This determination can be made using an EEG to detect an electrical
brainwave known as the P300.57 The P300 response is a measurable
spike in the brain’s electrical activity that typically occurs milliseconds
after exposure to a familiar stimulus.58 In a usual study, a subject is
presented with a meaningful stimulus—one with which the subject has
prior knowledge and experience—and a series of unmeaningful
stimuli.59 For instance, if the murder weapon was a gun, the guilty
suspect would be randomly shown a number of unmeaningful objects,
such as a knife or a hammer, as well as the meaningful object, the gun.60
The subject’s brain, recognizing the gun, would then elicit a P300
response, but would fail to register a P300 response for the other
objects, thus indicating guilty knowledge.61
Several features of EEG-based memory detection are relevant in
determining whether this form of mind-reading constitutes coercion.
First, like fMRI-based lie detection, the process is neither physically
invasive nor painful. Indeed, the only contact with a subject is through
the placement of small electrodes on the subject’s scalp which register
and measure brainwaves.62 Second, a subject does not have to verbally
answer for the P300 response to register. Rather, the P300 response is
subconscious and uncontrollable.63 Third, unlike fMRI-based lie
55. Wolfe, supra note 30.
56. See id. (quoting neuroscientist Bobby Azarian, “[n]ot only is ultra-high resolution brain
imaging technology coming soon, we can predict lie detection to be one of its earliest
applications.”).
57. Murphy & Rissman, supra note 4, at 5.
58. Id. at 6.
59. Id. at 5.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 6.
62. Id. at 5.
63. Paul McGorrey, Mind-reading Technology Should not be Used to Solve Crime, THE
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detection, EEG techniques require far less cooperation, since head
movements do not necessarily distort data quality.64 Fourth, whereas an
interrogator may need to physically subdue a subject to ensure accurate
fMRI scans, brain waves can be measured by simply placing a cap on a
subject’s head.65 Finally, unlike an fMRI, an EEG can measure a
subject’s brainwaves while the subject is sitting comfortably in a chair.66
Numerous studies have proven that EEG-based memory detection
is accurate and replicable in a lab environment.67 Moreover, strategies
have been developed to resist countermeasures, which are attempts by
guilty subjects to distort EEG measurements.68 Lastly, new techniques
leveraging machine learning algorithms are currently being explored in
the hopes of improving the classification rate of guilty and innocent
subjects.69
Despite the technique’s developmental progress, most researchers
believe EEG-based memory detection is not yet ready for forensic
application. Regardless, some countries are now attempting to
determine whether successful tests in controlled laboratory settings can
be replicated in real-world interrogation scenarios.70 Other countries,
defying expert consensus, have already licensed the technology for use
in forensic assessments and preliminary criminal investigations.71
CONVERSATION (September 25, 2017, 4:04 PM), https://theconversation.com/mind-readingtechnology-should-not-be-used-to-solve-crime-83874.
64. Klaus Gramann & Max Plank, The Use of Electroencephalography in Neuroergonomics,
in NEUROERGONOMICS: THE BRAIN AT WORK AND IN EVERYDAY LIFE 11, 11 (Hasan Ayaz &
Frederic Dehais eds., 2018).
65. Id. at 12.
66. Id. at 11.
67. See, e.g., John Meixner & J. Peter Rosenfeld, A Mock Terrorism Application of the P300based Concealed Information Test, 48 SOC’Y FOR PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGICAL RES. 149, 149 (2011).
For example, in a mock-terrorism lab study, participants pretended that they were part of a deadly
terrorist plot. Id. at 150. The participants in the terrorism category then wrote a letter to the
“leader” of the plot revealing that there would be a bombing in Houston in July. Id. Later, when
the participants were shown keywords (e.g., “bomb,” “Houston,” “July”) the researchers were
able to correlate P300 waves with guilty knowledge 100 percent of the time. Id. at 152. For
unknown aspects of the crime, the researchers were able to identify ten of the twelve participants
assigned to the terrorist group and did not misidentify any “innocent” participants. Id.
68. See generally Michel Funicelli et al., An Independent Validation of the EEG Based
Complex Trial Protocol with Autobiographical Data and Corroboration of its Resistance to a
Cognitively Charged Countermeasure, APPLIED PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY & BIOFEEDBACK (2021); J.
Peter Rosenfeld et al., The Complex Trial Protocol (CTP): A New Countermeasure Resistant
Accurate P300-Based Method for Detection of Concealed Information, 45 SOC’Y FOR
PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGICAL RES. 906 (2008).
69. Murphy & Rissman, supra note 4, at 15.
70. Univ. of Canterbury, Brainwave Activity That Reveals Knowledge of Crime (January 16,
2020), https://medicalxpress.com/news/2020-01-brainwave-reveals-knowledge-crime.html.
71. Murphy & Rissman, supra note 4, at 18.
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Overall, EEG-based memory detection is a more promising technology
than fMRI-based lie detection and requires minimal invasiveness and
cooperation in an interrogation setting.
C. Future Technology: Real-Time Thought Extraction
Advancements in artificial intelligence and machine learning have
made real-time thought extraction possible. While fMRI-based lie
detection detects a simple mental attitude (e.g., deception), and EEGbased memory detection focuses on recognition, real-time thought
extraction has the potential to create “a live recording of what is going
on in a person’s mind.”72 Thanks to both fMRI and EEG technology,
scientists can already decode rudimentary information about what a
“person is currently perceiving, feeling, thinking about, imagining,
remembering, attending to, intending to do, or even dreaming about.”73
Researchers believe it is only a matter of time before technologies
can decode a subject’s internal dialogue and visually reconstruct the
subject’s live thoughts.74 In a recent study, for example, subjects
watched a movie trailer while an fMRI scanned their brains.75 The
fMRI data was then translated by an artificial intelligence program,
which recreated the trailer on a computer screen with a surprising level
of accuracy and detail.76 While current technology only scratches the
surface of human thought, technology capable of producing an accurate
recreation of current human thought may only be ten to fifteen years
away from application in the law enforcement realm.77
As the Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues
72. Gerben Meynen, Brain-Based Mind Reading in Forensic Psychiatry: Exploring
Possibilities and Perils, 4 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 311, 317–18 (2017).
73. Murphy & Rissman, supra note 4, at 3.
74. Jerry Kaplan, The Machines That Will Read Your Mind, THE WALL ST. J. (April 5, 2019,
10:55 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-machines-that-will-read-your-mind-11554476156.
75. Yasmin Anwar, Scientists Use Brain Imaging to Reveal the Movies in our Mind,
BERKELEY NEWS (September 22, 2011), https://news.berkeley.edu/2011/09/22/brain-movies/.
76. Id. Researchers have also used an EEG to reconstruct videos from subjects’ neural
activities. See, e.g., Matthew North, AI Recreates Videos People are Watching by Reading Their
Minds, NEW SCIENTIST (November 26, 2019), https://www.newscientist.com/article/2224866-airecreates-videos-people-are-watching-by-reading-their-minds/. In one study, brainwave activity
was measured as the subjects watched video clips that included nature scenes, people on jet skis,
and human expressions. Id. The artificial intelligence program then reconstructed 234 videos and
also successfully categorized 210 videos, providing tags such as waterfalls, extreme sports, or
human faces. Id.
77. See Cherly Ann, A Mind-Reading A.I., DATA DRIVEN INV. (December 7, 2019),
https://medium.datadriveninvestor.com/a-mind-reading-a-i-83e781ce927b (“Instead of a police
officer asking questions, they’ll stick a helmet on to decide what it is that’s going through your
mind.”).
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noted, these various neuroscience techniques “might soon reveal …
whether an individual recognizes a face or an object, possesses
knowledge relevant to a legal proceeding, is lying or telling the truth,
or even allow reconstruction of the visual imagery seen at the time of
the crime.”78 The legality of these promising interrogation techniques
depends upon the interpretation of the term coercion in Article 17.
III. AN ELEMENTAL FORMULATION OF COERCION
This section argues that coercion, in the context of Article 17,
requires the imposition of physical and/or mental discomfort (harm
element) on the POW by way of force or threats (force element) for
the purpose of compelling the POW to reveal information (compulsion
requirement). This section further argues that torture is an aggravated
form of coercion, as torture requires the infliction of more severe pain
and suffering. Thus, coercion sets the minimum threshold level of
severity necessary to violate Article 17.
This analysis will proceed in two parts. Subsection A summarizes
two views on coercion: the Free Will Approach and the Duty Approach.
Subsection B critiques these two approaches and argues for an
alternative formulation.
A. The Free Will Approach and the Duty Approach
1. The Free Will Approach
The Free Will Approach focuses on a POW’s autonomy to choose
whether to divulge information.79 Any method which compromises a
POW’s ability to choose constitutes coercion.80 Since mind-reading
technology extracts valuable cognitive information against a subject’s
will, use of this interrogation method violates Article 17.81 This approach

78. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, GRAY
MATTERS: TOPICS AT THE INTERSECTION OF NEUROSCIENCE, ETHICS, AND SOCIETY at 102
(2015).
79. Thompson, supra note 9, at 1617. See also JENNIFER ELSEA, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE, LAWFULNESS OF INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES UNDER THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS at 15 (2004) (“The pertinent question appears to be whether the person subject to
treatment designed to influence his conduct is able to exercise a choice and complies willingly or
has no choice other than to comply.”). Notice, this definition is slightly different than the Free
Will Approach’s, as it seemingly requires “treatment designed to influence” the subject. Id. Thus,
mind-reading technology which does not require the subject’s cooperation might not be coercive
under this definition, since the technology is not influencing the subject to do anything.
80. Thompson, supra note 9, at 1617.
81. Id.
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does not require any application of harmful force on a subject; the only
relevant factor is whether the method in question “has robbed the
[subject] of his free will to choose.”82 A notable endorser of this
approach is the International Committee of the Red Cross (“ICRC”).83
Two sources of United States’ law seem to have heavily influenced
adoption of this broad interpretation:84 Manuals regulating intelligence
gathering and Supreme Court jurisprudence.85 Under Supreme Court
precedent, a confession is the product of coercion if the “defendant’s
will was overborne or if his confession was not the product of a rational
intellect and a free will.”86 In Townsend v. Sain, for example, the
Supreme Court opined that a confession elicited while the defendant
was under the influence of a “truth serum” would be inadmissible in
court, because a truth serum would compromise a defendant’s ability
to freely and rationally choose what information to reveal.87
Despite this holding, a Congressional Research Service Report (the
“Report”) analyzing the lawfulness of interrogation techniques under
the Geneva Conventions, found that “the standards that apply in
criminal cases . . . probably do not apply to a determination of coercion
under the Geneva Conventions.”88 The Report offers no reason for this
conclusion, but two compelling reasons exist which make it doubtful
the Geneva drafters meant to incorporate this understanding of
coercion. First, none of the drafting materials or official statements ever
mention the Free Will Approach.89 Second, the rights of a criminal
defendant in the United States are protected by the United States
Constitution, which has been interpreted to protect fundamental fair
trial rights, such as the right against self-incrimination and the right to
remain silent. POWs, however, derive their rights from international
treaties, and under Geneva III, POWs do not benefit from the
equivalent of domestic fair trial rights unless they are suspected
82. Id.
83. 2020 ICRC Commentary, supra note 11, art. 17 (“The decisive factor in determining
whether coercion has occurred or is occurring is whether the method used deprives or impairs the
prisoner of the exercise of free will and autonomy.”).
84. See, e.g., Dep’t of the Army, FM 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation ¶ 1-8 (1992)
[hereinafter FM 34-52] (“Physical or mental torture and coercion revolve around eliminating the
source’s free will.”).
85. Thompson, supra note 9, at 1615.
86. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 307 (1963) (internal quotation marks omitted).
87. Id. On the other hand, to assert coercion as a criminal defense, a defendant must show
that he was under an objectively reasonable fear of imminent injury or death when he committed
the alleged offense. D’Aquino v. United States, 192 F.2d 338, 359 (9th Cir. 1951).
88. ELSEA, supra note 79, at 14.
89. See discussion infra Part III. B.
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criminals or are facing prosecution.90 Moreover, the vast majority of
POW interrogations are conducted to acquire strategic and tactical
military information, not to obtain evidence of criminal guilt.91
The more influential source has been the United States Armed
Forces’ now-replaced Field Manual 34-52 Intelligence Interrogation
(FM 34-52). Identical to its successor document FM 2-22.3, FM 34-52
states “[p]hysical or mental torture and coercion revolve around
eliminating the source’s free will” and are “expressly prohibited by . . .
Articles 13 and 17 [of Geneva III]”92 The ICRC’s Commentary of 2020
on Article 17 (the “2020 ICRC Commentary”) cites FM 34-52 as proof
that coercion includes any method that impairs POWs’ exercise of free
will or autonomy.93
FM 34-52, however, does not actually support the broad
interpretation of coercion assigned by the ICRC. First, that both torture
and coercion “revolve around eliminating the source’s free will” does
not reduce the cause of action for coercion and torture to simply one
element (whether the information was received voluntarily). Rather,
“revolves around” merely acknowledges the goal of tortious and
coercive questioning: to acquire information against the detainee’s
wishes. Torture, for example, also requires the infliction of “severe pain
or suffering.”94 Similarly, though the goal of coercive interrogation
techniques is to acquire information against a subject’s wishes, this does
not imply that the only element of coercion is loss of free will.
Second, the 2020 ICRC Commentary omits the important fact that
FM 34-52 specifically defines coercion “as actions designed to
unlawfully induce another to compel an act against one’s will.”95 The
compulsion requirement is crucial to assessing the legality of mindreading because the techniques discussed in Part II do not require
detainees to affirmatively act against their wills. Lastly, the 2020 ICRC
Commentary seemingly relies on FM 34-52, even though it was
replaced in 2009 by FM 2-22.3.96 While FM 2-22.3 similarly contains the
90. See Robin Geiß, Name, Rank, and Serial Number and the Right to Remain Silent, 87
INT’L REV. RED CROSS 721, 731—32 (2005) (Arguing that POWs gain the protection of fair trial
rights when “questioning as to their individual involvement in potentially criminal activities
begins.”) Note, while a country may accord all POWs fair trial rights starting at the beginning of
capture, no country is bound to do so under Geneva III. Id. at 729.
91. Id.
92. FM 34-52, supra note 84, at ¶ 1-8.
93. 2020 ICRC Commentary, supra note 11, art. 17 n. 39.
94. ELSEA, supra note 79, at 9.
95. FM 34-52 at ¶1-8 (emphasis added).
96. See Exec. Order No. 13491, 74 C.F.R. 4893 (2009) (requiring CIA and other Executive
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“revolves around” provision,97 it also contains a list of illustrative
examples that constitute coercion:
Although no single comprehensive source defines impermissible coercion, certain
acts are clearly prohibited. Certain prohibited physical coercion may be obvious,
such as physically abusing the subject of the screening or interrogation. Other
forms of impermissible coercion may be more subtle, and may include threats to
turn the individual over to others to be abused; subjecting the individual to
impermissible humiliating or degrading treatment; implying harm to the individual
or his property. Other prohibited actions include implying a deprivation of
applicable protections guaranteed by law because of a failure to cooperate;
threatening to separate parents from their children; or forcing a protected person
98
to guide [American] forces in a dangerous area.

These impermissible examples all share a common attribute: they
cause unpleasant and painful physical or mental suffering. Moreover,
the examples of mental suffering seem limited to threats of violence or
substantial punishment, such as separating parents from their
children.99 Inputting mind-reading technology into the list, as the Free
Will Approach would mandate, would be a rather awkward addition.
Overall, the ICRC’s position rests on shaky ground, as support for the
Free Will Approach is absent in the Article 17 text,100 the drafting
materials,101 and the ICRC’s own cited materials.102
Furthermore, application of the Free Will Approach poses a
number of significant theoretical and practical problems. One such
problem is that the Free Will Approach seemingly suggests that
coercion is always successful. If a subject does not reveal the desired
information, the subject’s free will has not been eliminated and there
was therefore no coercion. This inference leads to the rather bizarre
conclusion that an interrogator can permissibly inflict the maximum
allowable suffering short of torture, which requires “severe” pain,103 as
long as the POW does not reveal information, yet cannot painlessly
read the POW’s mind. Even more strange, this suggestion implies that
the legality of a particular interrogation technique is totally dependent
on the outcome. Take, for example, one situation in which a soldier is
subject to significant abuse short of torture: Wall-standing, loud noise,

agencies to proceed with interrogations “strictly in accord with the principles, processes,
conditions, and limitations” FM 2-22.3 prescribes).
97. See FM 22-2.3, supra note 18, at 5-26 (“Physical or mental torture and coercion revolve
around eliminating the source’s free will, and are expressly prohibited . . . .”).
98. Id. at 5-22.
99. Id.
100. See discussion infra Part III. B.
101. See discussion infra Part III. B.
102. 2020 ICRC Commentary, supra note 11, art. 17 n. 39.
103. See infra notes 144–55.
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sleep deprivation, hooding, and deprivation of food and water.104 The
soldier musters the will to resist relinquishing critical military
intelligence. Under the Free Will Approach, the techniques used in this
situation do not technically constitute ‘coercion.’ Imagine, however, the
same soldier in an alternative scenario reveals valuable intelligence.
Now, these same techniques would constitute ‘coercion.’
A more generous interpretation is that the Free Will Approach
considers coercive any interrogation method that may objectively
collapse the POW’s ability to rationally choose. Even with this
interpretation, the previous problem persists: what acts may
“objectively” destroy a POW’s autonomy and free will to choose? Are
a few slaps and shaking objectively linked to the destruction of a
POW’s free will? The dividing line between permissible interrogation
methods and acts that “objectively” deprive a POW of his free will is
not readily apparent.
2. The Duty Approach
The Duty Approach is neither widespread nor pervasive in
commentaries on Article 17. In fact, the only mention of the approach
is in an old Judge Advocate General (“JAG”) Opinion in response to
an inquiry about the legality of truth serum.105 In response to the
inquiry, the JAG concluded that the use of a truth serum during
interrogations violates Article 17.106 The reason, according to the JAG,
is that Article 17 was enacted to protect every POW’s duty “to refrain
from giving military information to his captors.”107 Thus, any
“inquisitorial” interrogation method beyond standard questioning
techniques must be banned to protect the POW’s obligation to remain
silent.108 If, as the JAG contends, Article 17 was passed to protect the
POW’s duty to refrain from revealing damaging information to the
104. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 96 (1978),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57506.
105. See Use of “Truth Serum”, supra note 22, at 708–09 (finding that the use of “truth
serum” in questioning POWs would violate the Geneva Conventions). For information about the
history and usage of truth serums in interrogations, see generally Brendan Borrell, What is Truth
Serum?, SCI. AM. (December 4, 2008), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/what-is-truthserum/ (recounting what truth serum is and its history vis-à-vis interrogation purposes). Truth
serums are drugs, such as sodium amytal and sodium pentothal, that were administered under the
belief that they “made people unable to censor themselves and they would just empty their
memories into a narrative statement.” Id.
106. Use of “Truth Serum,” supra note 22, at 709.
107. Id. at 708–09.
108. See id. (affirming the prohibition of “coercion and treatment” in part based on POW
duty to refrain from divulging information).
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enemy, then the use of a mind-reading device, like the use of a truth
serum, is surely prohibited. Such a device would eviscerate the POW’s
obligation to conceal information and would thus defeat the purpose
of Article 17.
The JAG’s approach rests on a misinterpretation of the ICRC’s
1960 Commentary on Article 17 (the “1960 Commentary”).109 This
ICRC analysis, which the JAG relied on, states that beyond ascertaining
the POW’s identity:
The Detaining power may very naturally be tempted to obtain additional
information from the prisoner, both in regard to himself and concerning the
circumstances which preceded his capture, for this is obviously of interest from the
military point of view. The prisoner may, and indeed must, refrain from giving
military information to the Detaining Power; he must therefore be protected
110
against any inquisitorial practices on the part of that Power.

The 1960 Commentary does not state that Article 17 was adopted
to protect a POW’s duty to refrain from revealing damaging
information, as the JAG opinion claims. Rather, it simply recognizes the
predicament of the POW: he is powerless in the hands of the detaining
party whose interests directly conflict with his. The POW, under
domestic law, must not reveal any damaging information or else he
risks punishment. The detaining party wants to extract as much
information as possible. Given that interrogation is inevitable,111
Article 17 was adopted to ensure that the detainer did not abuse its
power in its quest to elicit information, and therefore provided the
POW basic humanitarian protection.112 The diplomatic discussions
preceding the adoption of Article 17 say as much, noting that the
purpose behind Article 17’s ban on coercive interrogation was “to give
fuller protection to [POWs] against pressure on the part of a capturing

109. See 1960 Commentary, supra note 27, at 156 (acknowledging the difficult circumstances
facing POWs, but stopping short of stating a duty to refrain from revealing damaging
information).
110. Id.
111. The notes of the Special Committee responsible for drafting Article 17 state “[i]t was
idle to harbor illusions. A state which had captured prisoners of war would always try to obtain
military information from them.” Preparatory Works of the Geneva Convention, 5th Meeting of
Committee II, Friday 29 April 1949.
112. HOWARD LEVIE, PRISONERS OF WAR IN INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 106 (vol.
59, 1979) (“From the moment of capture there also arises the problem of the extent to which the
Detaining Power may seek or extract information from the new prisoner of war. In Article 17 the
[Third Geneva] Convention has attempted . . . to remedy the deplorable situation in this regard
which existed during World War II.”). See also Delbert D. Smith, The Geneva Prisoner of War
Convention: An Appraisal, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 880, 884 (1967) (noting that the rules coming out
of the Third Geneva Convention attempted to “create a ‘right’ to decent and humane treatment
for the prisoner . . . .”).
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state that wished to obtain information of a military character.”113 Thus,
Article 17 was not constructed to protect the POW’s obligation to
withhold information. Such an argument rests on the unfounded
assumption that the framers of Geneva III favored concealing
information over eliciting it, when in fact they simply sought protection
for powerless POWs.
B. A More Faithful Interpretation of Coercion: Protecting POWs from
Harmful Interrogation Techniques
This section primarily argues that “coercion” as used in Article 17
contains a harm element. This definition derives from: 1) the plain
meaning of the word “coercion” at the time Article 17 was drafted; 2)
the term’s neighboring statutory text; and 3) a comparison of Article 17
with its predecessor in the 1929 Geneva Convention.114 Moreover, this
definition squares with the purpose behind the prohibition of coercive
interrogation: to protect POWs from harm and suffering that
accompanies it. This purpose is evident from the historical context
surrounding Article 17’s inclusion in Geneva III: the brutal
mistreatment of POWs during World War I and World War II.
1. Textual Analysis
Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, statutory
interpretation begins with the plain meaning of the text because the
statute conveys the drafters’ purpose.115 Statutorily undefined words
are given their ordinary meaning.116 In United States jurisprudence,
ordinary meaning is typically derived from dictionaries that were
published at the time the statute was enacted.117 When Geneva III was
drafted and ratified, the unambiguous generalized definition of
coercion contemplated three of the four elements specified above: (1)
the use or threat of physical and/or mental force against (2) another (3)
in order to compel a certain course of conduct against the subject’s

113. Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, at 250 (Berne 1949),
https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/Dipl-Conf-1949-Final_Vol-2-A.pdf.
114. Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 17, Jul. 27, 1929, 47 Stat.
2021, 2 Bevans 932 [hereinafter 1929 Convention].
115. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331 (“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”).
116. Id.
117. See MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218, 227–28 (1994) (assessing the meaning
of the word “modify” by looking at various dictionary definitions published around the time the
statute was enacted).
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will.118 Even the 2020 ICRC Commentary recognizes this as the
“ordinary” definition, but inexplicably adopts the Free Will Approach
in the very next sentence.119
Absent from the plain meaning definition, however, is the harm
element. Instead, the harm element is inferred from the verb “inflict”
in the surrounding statutory text. Article 17 reads: “No physical or
mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on
prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind
whatever.”120 Rewriting Article 17 in the active voice, the Article would
state: ‘The detaining power may not inflict any physical or mental
torture, nor any other form of coercion, on prisoners of war to secure
from them information of any kind whatever.’ In common usage, what
is “inflicted” is usually something that is very unpleasant or painful that
results in discomfort or suffering to the recipient.121 In 1961, Webster’s
Dictionary defined “inflict” to mean “to lay (a blow) on, cause
(something damaging or painful) to be endured.”122 Similarly, the
Oxford Universal Dictionary defined inflict to mean “to lay on as a
stoke, blow, or wound.”123 Thus, properly understood from the context,
the prohibition on coercion is the prohibition against inflictions of cruel
and inhuman suffering in order to secure information.124
118. See, e.g., Coercion, supra note 25. This definition was also used in other legal fields: For
example, in the labor law field, coercion was defined as “pressure exerted on employees to deter
them from participating, or to impel them to participate, in self-organization and collective
bargaining or to influence their choice of a bargaining agent.” DICTIONARY OF LABOR LAW
TERMS (2d ed. 1953). Moreover, the modern definition is essentially the same: Oxford Dictionary
defines coercion as “the practice of persuading someone to do something by using force or
threats.” OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2000). Note that the ordinary dictionary
definition requires two more elements than is required in the Free Will Approach.
119. See 2020 ICRC Commentary, supra note 11, art. 17 (“The decisive factor in determining
whether coercion . . . is occurring is whether the method used deprives or impairs the prisoner of
the exercise of free will and autonomy.”).
120. Geneva III, supra note 11, art. 17 (emphasis added).
121. For example, Cambridge Dictionary defines inflict as “to force someone to experience
something very unpleasant“ and provides this example: “The suffering inflicted on these children
DICTIONARY
(2021)
was
unimaginable.”
Inflict,
CAMBRIDGE
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/inflict. According to Oxford Languages, to
“inflict” means to “cause (something unpleasant or painful) to be suffered by someone or
something” and provides this illustrative example: “[T]hey inflicted serious injuries on three other
OXFORD
LANGUAGES
men.”
Inflict,
https://www.google.com/search?q=inflict&oq=inflict&aqs=chrome.0.69i59j35i39j69i59l2j0i433j6
9i60l3.978j1j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8.
122. Inflict, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
(1961).
123. Inflict, THE OXFORD UNIVERSAL DICTIONARY ON HISTORICAL PRINCIPLES (1972).
124. Other scholars also understand “coercive interrogation” to entail a harm element. See
Glod & Smith, supra note 16, at 148 (“Thus, Article 17 serves to protect the prisoner from yielding
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The Free Will Approach cannot be squared with the inclusion of the
verb “inflict.” Inflicting “the loss of autonomy” or the “subversion of
one’s will” does not comport with the unpleasant and painful
connotation that is usually associated with the term “inflict.” Nor is
Article 17’s phraseology a common way of expressing the prohibition
on subverting someone’s will. It would be unnatural, for example, to
describe an interrogator’s conduct, which includes administering mild
physical blows and aggressive shouting, as “inflicting a loss of
autonomy” on the recipient. Ultimately, if the drafters truly intended
to communicate the Free Will Approach, they would have constructed
the coercion prohibition in an altogether different way.
The inclusion of the phrase “other form” in Article 17 provides
further textual evidence that coercion requires an infliction of suffering
and abuse. Article 17 bans physical torture, mental torture, and “any
other form of coercion.”125 The statute does not state ‘no physical or
mental torture, nor any form of coercion, may be inflicted on POWs.’ If
Article 17 was written that way, it would perhaps suggest that coercion
and torture are distinct prohibitions. Rather, the inclusion of the term
“other” makes it clear that physical and mental torture are examples,
among “other[s],” of coercion. Members of a common category must
have some shared characteristic that unites them. Since torture falls
under the umbrella category of coercion in Article 17, the “other”
prohibited “forms” of coercion must have at least one shared quality
with torture.
The most prominent element of torture is the high degree of
physical or mental pain.126 Given that physical and mental torture were
the illustrative examples of coercion chosen by the drafters, it is likely
that this prominent characteristic is the common element of torture and
other forms of coercion. Put in more plain terms, it would be strange if
a neighbor, when asked to identify an act constituting “mental torture,”
“physical torture,” and “any other form of coercion,” responded with
to a temptation to divulge information due to fear of pain and to guard the prisoner from other
external pressures.”); Maria F. Blanc, Moral Permissibility and Legitimacy of the Use of Coercive
Interrogations: Implications for the Intelligence Professional, Participating Health-Care
Professionals, and Society, 1 INT’L J. INTEL. ETHICS 122, 123 (2010) (“[T]he essence of coercive
interrogation is the imposition of a time-limited physical and mental discomfort on the
interrogatee so as to force information out of him.”).
125. Geneva III, supra note 11, art. 17 (emphasis added).
126. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment art. 1, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (defining torture as “any act by which severe
pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person.”) (emphasis
added).
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‘painlessly reading someone’s mind.’ The differing factor, of course,
would be the degree of pain inflicted, as torture requires the infliction
of “severe pain,” whereas other forms of ill-treatment typically require
milder inflictions.
Indeed, in other statutory contexts in which torture was deemed an
aggravated form of a less severe treatment, courts have similarly found
that the common element binding torture and the less severe treatment
was the infliction of pain.127 For example, Article 3 of the European
Convention on Human Rights (the “European Convention”) states:
“[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment.”128 The European Court on Human Rights
(the “ECHR”) has interpreted this provision to mean that torture is an
aggravated form of inhuman treatment that requires the infliction of
very severe and cruel suffering.129 In Ireland v. United Kingdom, the
court addressed the use of certain British military interrogation
techniques—wall-standing, loud noise, sleep deprivation, hooding, and
deprivation of food and water—against suspected members of the Irish
Republican Army.130 The ECHR held that these techniques did not rise
to the level of torture.131 In its decision, the ECHR first noted that the
principal difference between torture and other inhuman treatment is
“the intensity of the suffering inflicted.”132 Torture, the court concluded,
carries a “special stigma” and should be limited only to those practices
of a “particular intensity or cruelty.”133 The court then held that the
interrogation techniques did not possess the requisite severity level to

127. See Prosecutor v. Br anin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, 483 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Sept. 1, 2004) (noting that “[t]he seriousness of the pain or suffering sets
torture apart from other forms of mistreatment.”). Moreover, Article 1(2) of the Declaration on
the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment states: “Torture constitutes an aggravated and deliberate
form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” G.A. Res. 3452 art. 1(2) (Dec. 9,
1975).
128. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953), amended by Protocols Nos. 3, 5, 8, & 11
(which entered into force Sept. 21, 1970, Dec. 20, 1971, Jan. 1, 1990, and Nov. 1, 1998, respectively)
[hereinafter ECHR], available at https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/convention_eng.pdf
(emphasis added).
129. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 167 (1978),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57506 (finding that since the techniques used caused
“physical and mental suffering” and “led to acute psychiatric disturbances during interrogation”
they fell under “inhuman treatment” as defined in the European Convention).
130. Id. at ¶ 96.
131. Id. at ¶ 168.
132. Id. at ¶ 167.
133. Id.

ZARRILLI_FINAL_NOTE_03.27_22 (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

PAVING THE WAY FOR MIND-READING

4/20/2022 8:32 PM

233

constitute torture, but did find that the interrogation practices
represented inhuman and cruel treatment.134
On the other hand, where acts cause little or no physical or mental
suffering, the ECHR has declined to find any violation of the
prohibition against inhuman treatment: In Rainen v. Finland, the court
found that the act of physically restraining a person for two hours, even
though completely unnecessary, did not attain “the minimum level of
severity” necessary to find a violation of the European Convention.135
Thus, in other statutes which, like Article 17, deem torture an extreme
form of less severe treatment, tribunals have found a minimum level of
suffering required to constitute a violation of the less severe treatment.
2. Purpose and Historical Context
The drafters’ intent, as evidenced by historical context and their
preparatory work, also confirms that coercion requires the infliction of
harm.136 Article 17 derives from an analogous provision in the 1929
Geneva Convention (the “1929 Convention”).137 The corresponding
provision of the 1929 Convention, Article 5, provided that “[no]
pressure shall be exercised on prisoners to obtain information
regarding the situation in their armed forces or their country.”138 Article
17 expanded the ban on “pressure” to prohibit “physical or mental
torture, []or any other form of coercion.” While “pressure” was
changed to “coercion” in Geneva III, English translations of the 1929
Convention typically substitute “coercion” for “pressure” in Article
5,139 as do scholarly commentaries.140 Thus, adding color to the word
“pressure” would shed light on the precise meaning of the word
“coercion” in Geneva III.

134. Id. at ¶ 168.
135. Raninen
v.
Finland,
2
Eur.
Ct.
H.R.
¶¶
54,
59
(1997),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-58123.
136. Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a treaty “shall be interpreted . . .
in the light of its object and purpose.” See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note
115. When discerning the treaty’s purpose and intent, it is proper to consult the preparatory work
of the treaty and the circumstances surrounding its adoption. Id.
137. 1929 Convention, supra note 114, art. 5.
138. Id.
139. For example, the official interpretation of the 1929 Geneva Convention from French
released by the Office of the Registrar in the United States contained the word “coercion” in
place of “pressure” in Article 5. Herbert Hoover, A Proclamation by the President of the United
States (August 1932), https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/geneva02.asp#art5.
140. See, e.g., John E. Wehrum Jr., The Status of United States Prisoners of War Under the
Code of Conduct for the Armed Forces, 21 CATH. U. L. REV. 133, 141 (1971) (quoting Article 5
of the 1929 Convention and substituting “coercion” for “pressure.”).
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a. The 1929 Convention
Article 5 in the 1929 Convention codified the growing international
sentiment that a detaining power should not use violent interrogation
tactics against detainees to obtain military information.141 For example,
the 1863 Lieber Code, one of the first modern attempts to codify the
law of war, states that the “the modern law of war permits no longer
the use of any violence against prisoners in order to extort the desired
information or to punish them for having given false information.”142
International law, however, lagged behind state action on this matter
such that by the start of World War I in 1914, no international treaty
formally outlawed harmful interrogations practices.143
To fill this void in international law, countries signed special
bilateral POW agreements with rival belligerents to ensure humane
treatment of their captured soldiers.144 For example, a 1918 Agreement
between the British and German governments (the “1918 Agreement”)
strictly forbade “forcible means of any kind to compel prisoners of war
to give information about their army or their country”145 Moreover, the
1918 Agreement provided that “[p]risoners of war, who refuse to give
information may neither be threatened nor insulted nor subjected to
any other treatment that puts them in a less favourable position than
other prisoners.”146 The language used here is similar to the language
used in Article 5 of the 1929 Convention and nearly identical to the
language used in Article 17.147 These similarities strongly suggest that
Article 17 sought to proscribe harmful applications of force.

141. See LEVIE, supra note 112, at 107 (“Prohibitions on the use of force to compel prisoners
of war to divulge information to the enemy are not a recent development.”).
142. U.S. Department of War, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United
States in the Field, General Orders No. 100, Apr. 24, 1863 (emphasis added).
143. The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, for example, imposed upon POWs the
obligation to reveal their identity to the enemy, but did not impose any specific obligation on
detaining parties to refrain from employing harmful interrogation practices beyond a general
requirement of humane treatment. See LEVIE, supra note 112, at 107.
144. Id.
145. Agreement Between the British and German Governments Concerning Combatant
Prisoners of War and Civilians, Gr. Brit-Ger., July 14, 1918, 111 BFSP 279 (emphasis added).
146. Id. art. XXIX.
147. Compare id., with 1929 Convention, supra note 114, art. 5 (“No pressure shall be
exercised on prisoners to obtain information regarding the situation in their armed forces or their
country. Prisoners who refuse to reply may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to
unpleasantness or disadvantages of any kind whatsoever.”) and Geneva III, supra note 11, art. 17
(“No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of
war to secure from them information of any kind whatever. Prisoners of war who refuse to answer
may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to any unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of
any kind.”).
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Few reported post-World War II cases discussed violations of
Article 5 of the 1929 Convention.148 One case, however, found that
unlawful interrogation under Article 5 required physical or mental
suffering be inflicted on a POW.149 In the Trial of Erich Killinger and
Four Others, three German military interrogators were accused of
contravening Article 5.150 To secure information, the interrogators
allegedly heated the POWs’ cells to an uncomfortable level, deprived
the POWs of medical attention, and physically struck the POWs.151 As
a matter of law, the court concluded that in order to prove unlawful
interrogation under Article 5, the prosecution must prove that the
“interrogation amounted to what could be described as physical or
mental ill-treatment.”152 The court found that the practices constituted
ill-treatment and convicted the German interrogators.153 Thus, the
Killinger decision confirmed that Article 5’s prohibition against
applying “pressure” is similar to the Lieber Code’s prohibition against
“violence” and the 1918 agreement’s prohibition against using “forcible
means.”
b. Geneva III
The impetus for Article 17 was the need to clarify the prohibition
against harmful questioning in the face of widespread violations of the
1929 Convention during World War II.154 The framers did not advocate
for additional limitations on interrogation techniques, but merely a
more precise formulation of the term “coercion” to limit
interrogational discretion.155 Thus, Article 17 preserved Article 5’s harm
requirement. The circumstances surrounding the reformulation of
Article 17 and the drafters’ own statements leave little room for doubt
as to this objective.

148. See LEVIE, supra note 114, at 291 (Noting that there are relatively few reported “World
War II (1939-45) war crimes trials involving the question of allowable and prohibited methods of
interrogating prisoners of war in the quest for information of military value.”).
149. See Trial Of Erich Killinger And Four Others, 68 (Brit. Milit. Ct., Wuppertal, Nov. 26thDec. 3rd, 1945) [hereinafter Killinger].
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. (emphasis added).
153. Id. at 67.
154. See Smith, supra note 112, at 892 (noting that “[t]he experiences of World War II had
demonstrated that coercion was not a self-defining term. The activities engaged in within several
interrogation camps made it necessary to limit interrogation discretion. By forbidding any other
form of coercion, [Geneva III] made clear that physical and mental torture do not exhaust the
possibilities; indeed, any form would also be prohibited.”) (internal quotations omitted).
155. Id.
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During World War II, parties to the conflict engaged in brutal
treatment of POWs.156 POWs were regularly sent to covert
interrogation camps placed outside the influence of the ICRC.157 There,
POWs were often beaten and brutalized for information.158 To acquire
military information at one POW camp, Nazi interrogators “kicked
[POWs], pulled their nails out, drowned them, hanged them from
beams by their legs[,] and hammered nails into their elbows, knees and
hip joints.”159 One scholar offered this sober assessment of the standard
interrogation methods used:
Before an interrogation began, the suspect was routinely roughed up for the shock
value. The effect of this arbitrary viciousness was to daze, humiliate, and throw
prisoners off balance at the outset in the contest of wills with their inquisitors. . . .
Once begun, the process was nearly irreversible. If the prisoner had nothing to say
under mild torture, the screws were progressively tightened. He might be dead or
dying before his tormentors could bring themselves to accept that he did indeed
160
know nothing.

The Geneva III framers believed that widespread violation of the
1929 Convention was made easy by imprecise formulations and thus
sought to make their 1949 version more precise.161 The attempt to
create a precise formulation is evident in the elaboration of the term
“coercion” in Article 17.162 The elaboration was primarily motivated by
the fact that “coercion” is not a self-defining term and the resulting
ambiguity lent interrogators significant discretion.163 The framers thus
recommended changing “pressure” to “moral or physical torture” as

156. See Stuart Dowell, A Hell ‘Worse Than Auschwitz’ Where Thousands Were Tortured and
Slain is Turned Into a Memorial Site, THEFIRSTNEWS (June 7, 2019),
https://www.thefirstnews.com/article/a-hell-worse-than-auschwitz-where-thousands-weretortured-and-slain-is-turned-into-memorial-site-6250 (reciting various acts of violence inflicted
on POWs during World War II).
157. 1960 Commentary, supra note 27, at 163.
158. Id.
159. Dowell, supra note 156.
160. Steven M. Kleinman, The Promise of Interrogation v. the Problem of Torture, 43 VAL.
U. L. REV. 1577, 1584 (2009) (quoting Joseph E. Persico, PIERCING THE REICH: THE
PENETRATION OF NAZI GERMANY BY AMERICAN SECRET AGENTS DURING WORLD WAR II at
81 (The Viking Press 1979)).
161. The preliminary Commission first set up by the ICRC to assess revisions to the 1929
Convention following World War II states this: “As to the principles which should govern any
such revision, several different opinions were expressed. Certain delegations stressed that the
provisions of any future Convention should be more detailed and precise, experience having
shown that vagueness in the wording led to most varied and sometimes arbitrary interpretations.”
Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, REPORT on the Work of the Preliminary Conference of National
Red Cross Societies for the Study of the Conventions and of Various Problems Relative to the Red
Cross
at
69
(Geneva,
July
26-Aug.
3,
1946),
https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/RC_report-1946.pdf.
162. Smith, supra note 112, at 892.
163. Id.
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well as “any other form of coercion” to make clear the “prohibition of
maltreatment of any kind whatsoever.”164 Notably, the term
“maltreatment” is very similar to the term ill-treatment used in the
Killinger case.165 Both indicate that the detaining party is prohibited
from inflicting abuse on POWs. According to the Oxford Universal
Dictionary, “maltreat” means “to abuse, ill-use; to handle roughly or
rudely.”166 Webster’s Dictionary similarly defines “maltreat” as “to treat
ill; treat roughly; abuse, mistreat.”167 Thus, the overarching aim of the
drafters was to clearly eliminate abusive interrogation practices.
Moreover, other scholars who have examined the drafting history
of Article 17 agree that its purpose was to respond to the widespread
cruel treatment perpetuated against POWs. The more specific
formulation of Article 17 was designed to “eliminate[] tortious
questioning,”168 respond to “the increased brutality of interrogation
techniques developed in World War II,”169 and to “limit interrogation
discretion” to prevent the rampant abuse seen in war camps.170 The
1960 ICRC Commentary notes that the drafters “were not content to
confirm the 1929 text,” and instead made it “more categorical” in
response to the “great hardship” inflicted on captured POWs and the
“flagrant violations” of Article 5 during World War II.171 The
overwhelming evidence suggests that Article 17, then, clearly meant to
proscribe mentally and physically damaging interrogation practices.
This conclusion confirms that coercion requires the harmful
application of force on a POW for the purpose of compelling
information.

164. Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Report on the Work of the Conference of Government
Experts for the Study of the Conventions for the Protection of War Victims at 123 (Geneva, April
14-26, 1947), https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/RC_report-1947.pdf.
165. Killinger, supra note 149, at 68.
166. Maltreatment, THE OXFORD UNIVERSAL DICTIONARY ON HISTORICAL PRINCIPLES
(1972).
167. Maltreat, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
(1961).
168. Neil McDonald & Scott Sullivan, Rational Interpretation in Irrational Times: The Third
Geneva Convention and the “War on Terror”, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 301, 308 (2003).
169. Wehrum Jr., supra note 140, at 141 n.38 (quoting Smith, supra note 112, at 891–92).
170. Smith, supra note 112, at 892.
171. 1960 Commentary, supra note 27, at 163.
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IV. APPLYING ARTICLE 17 TO MIND-READING TECHNOLOGY: NO
PAIN, NO PROBLEM
Given that the literal act of reading someone’s mind is painless and
noninvasive 172 and assuming reading someone’s mind does not cause
mental suffering,173 mind-reading does not constitute coercion and
therefore does not violate Article 17. Yet, the acts taken to induce a
noncompliant detainee’s cooperation may violate the harm element.
The legality of the use of mind-reading technology, therefore, is
probably instrument-dependent and varies based on both the level of
cooperation required and the acts needed to ensure compliance.
A. Evaluation of Current Mind-Reading Instruments
EEG-based memory detection and real-time thought extraction
would not violate Article 17 because EEGs require a minimal amount
of cooperation.174 First, an EEG does not require a noncooperative
detainee to be immobilized. An EEG can record data even while the
subject is moving, so the detainee does not have to be restrained.
Second, an EEG permits data collection in a perfectly normal
interrogation environment. An interrogator can simply place an EEG
cap on a detainee’s head and conduct a routine interrogation. Because
an EEG is neither physically invasive nor painful, the use of an EEGbased mind-reading device on a noncooperative POW would not
violate Article 17.
When an fMRI is used to extract cognitive information, however,
the question of legality is much closer though probably legal under
Article 17.175 It is true that a noncooperative subject must be
immobilized while undergoing an fMRI, as even slight head
movements during the scanning process can compromise the quality of
the scans. Moreover, interrogators have to forcibly place the subject
onto the table that slides into the fMRI scanner. And an fMRI does not
permit scanning in normal interrogational environments, as the
noncooperative detainee must be slid into the scanner. Thus, it is not all
that unlikely that a claustrophobic detainee might experience mental
suffering while in the fMRI machine and that this could rise to the level
of coercion. While this Note establishes harm as an element of coercion,
it does not seek to establish the threshold of harm that gives rise to
172.
173.
174.
175.

See discussion supra Part II.
See discussion supra note 28.
See discussion supra notes 62-69.
See discussion supra notes 42-45.
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liability under Article 17. Answering that question is critical to a
determination about the legality of fMRI-based mind-reading, but is
beyond the scope of this Note.
B. Mind-Reading is Not Coercive Even if It Facilitates More Coercion
Even if the application of mind-reading technology is painless, one
scholar, Jonathan Marks, believes mind-reading technology may
actually exacerbate instances of coercion and torture.176 Marks
contends that because current mind-reading devices only indicate
whether a detainee is lying or has knowledge about a valuable topic, a
mind-reading device will merely act as a screener that will then
facilitate “more aggressive interrogation” to elicit more specific
information.177 If mind-reading technology facilitates greater inflictions
of harm on detainees, such technology may violate Article 17.
Marks’ line of reasoning is unavailing, however, for multiple
reasons. First, his argument rests on the faulty assumption that critical
information cannot be gleaned solely from a mind-reading device.
Through a series of questions, a lie-detector, however, can obtain
valuable information, such as the enemy’s susceptibility and capacity to
attack, and whether the enemy is planning an attack. Thus, mindreading devices can acquire critical information without the need for
additional interrogation.
Second, even if mind-reading technology facilitates further
interrogation, it is doubtful that it will make the detaining power more
or less likely to violate Article 17. Marks’s argument rests on the
assumption that a detaining party will coerce or torture detainees who
it suspects have valuable information, which was acquired from mindreading technologies. Yet, there are many reasons why a detaining
power may suspect a detainee is withholding information, such as the
detainee’s rank, demeanor, or the circumstances surrounding their
capture. Detaining parties are frequently faced with uncooperative
detainees who they suspect have valuable information, and yet still
choose to lawfully interrogate them without resorting to unlawful
methods.
Third, even assuming that a detaining power was more likely to
aggressively interrogate a detainee, Marks does not take into account

176. Jonathan H. Marks, Interrogational Neuroimaging in Counterterrorism: A No-Brainer or
a Human Rights Hazard, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 483, 495 (2007).
177. Id. at 499.
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that mind-reading devices would screen out detainees with no valuable
information and may reduce total instances of coercive interrogation.
V. CONCLUSION
Insistence that Article 17 prohibits the use of mind-reading devices
ultimately ignores both the text and spirit behind Geneva III, and
renders its protections counterproductive. Prohibitions on mental and
physical abuse contained in Article 17 of Geneva III should be strictly
followed. The use of mind-reading technology, however, is completely
painless and is therefore not proscribed by Article 17. Moreover, an
interpretation of Geneva III that would forbid mind-reading on POWs
fails to deal with captors’ overwhelming incentives to use the
technology. If any blanket prohibition on the use of mind-reading
technology would assuredly be broken, captors who have already
violated Article 17 would also disregard other limits on interrogation.
Thus, allowing some mind-reading will also increase compliance with
Article 17 and validate the spirit and goals of the framers of Geneva
III. Instead of determining whether mind-reading is legally permissible
altogether, the focus must be on resolving which kind of mind-reading
instruments are permissible under Article 17.

